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GOVERNANCE AND LEGISLATURE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS 
AT THE STATE GOVERNMENT LEVEL OF NIGERIA’S 
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM 
 
Samuel Oni 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Several decades after political independence, Nigeria is still faced with the problem of the 
right model of governance that will achieve its noble objectives. Following the collapse of 
the First Republic, Nigeria jettisoned the Westminster parliamentary system and adopted 
the presidential system. Neither has the parliamentary nor the presidential model of 
governance been able to guarantee the political stability that is much needed for 
development and the relationship between the executive and legislature being the single 
most problematic issue. With heavy reliance on empirical and secondary data, this paper 
examines the nature of legislature-executive relations at the state level of Nigeria’s 
presidential system and found that these two political institutions have been relating with 
each other under an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, acrimony and political rivalry 
orchestrated largely by local godfathers in alliance with the presidency. It therefore argues 
that, while legislative-executive conflict may be inevitable in the presidential democratic 
government, mechanism for harmonious relationship between the legislature and executive 
is imperative for good governance in Nigeria. 
 
Key words: Governance, legislature-executive, relations, state government, 
presidential system, Nigeria 
 
Introduction 
Governance is essential to any political system. While people may disagree 
about the best means of achieving good governance, it is quite a consensus 
among men that effective and good governance is absolutely imperative for 
social, political and economic progress of every country (Ogundiya, 2010, p. 
202) and is indispensable for the achievement of the noble objectives of a state 
(Fabbrini, 1995; Oburota, 2003). Governance is viewed in terms of the structure 
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and the procedures of the legislative, judicial, executive and administrative 
bodies at all the tiers of the government of a state (Gill, 2002; Gberevbie, 2014).  
Since governance is both a structure and a process, the onus is on every 
state to adopt a model of governance whose structure and process it considers 
suitable for the achievement of its noble objectives. Several decades after 
political independence, Nigeria is still faced with the problem of achieving her 
noble ends by the models of governance it has operated with. Neither has the 
parliamentary nor the presidential model of governance been able to guarantee 
political stability much needed for sustainable development. At the dawn of its 
political independence, Nigeria was bequeathed the Westminster-style 
parliamentary system with the hope that the structure would usher in 
procedures for sustainable democracy and good governance. Paradoxically, 
Nigeria plunged into conflicts, which rocked the basis of the country due to the 
foundations as well as consolidated deficient social, economic, political, and 
developmental structures laid from the beginning, arising from the colonial origin 
of the Nigerian state (Dudley, 1982; Nwabueze, 1985; Akinboye & Anifowose, 
1999).  
The restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria on October, 1979 after fourteen 
years of military rule was quite important in the political history of Nigeria as the 
country jettisoned the Westminster model for the executive presidential and 
gubernatorial government modeled after that of the United States of America. 
The political bureau of 1987, the 1989 Constitution, the 1994 Constitutional 
Conference and the 1999 Constitution all supported the retention of presidential 
system as a model of government for Nigeria, despite the acrimonious politics of 
the Second Republic. Following the adoption of the presidential system, 
therefore, neither is any arm of government superior nor subordinate to the 
other. Each of the executive, legislature and the judiciary is independent within 
its own sphere of influence. The fact that Nigeria operates a federal constitution 
means the replication of the separate arms of government both at the federal 
and the state level of government. Following the federal model, each state’s 
executive and legislature derive their powers from the constitution. The head of 
the executive branch, at the state level, is the Governor while the legislative 
body, at the state level, is the State House of Assembly. The executive branch 
is separate both in function and personnel from the State House of Assembly. 
However, for the purpose of government, these two political institutions of 
government are expected to operate in an atmosphere of cordial relationship. In 
essence, flexibility, understanding and cooperation between the Governor who 
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is the chief executive and the State House of Assembly in the process of 
governance are mostly desired. That is why over the years, scholars of intra-
governmental relations are very keen at expanding the frontiers of knowledge 
on the nature and implications of the relationship between the chief executive 
and the legislature particularly, in the presidential system (Bernick & Wiggins, 
1981; Cheibub, 2007). Such diagnosis will bring to limelight the nature of 
legislature-executive relations in the federating units of Nigerian presidential 
system and the factors engendering such relationship with a view to bringing to 
the fore valid modalities for improving legislature-executive relations, especially 
as the country undergoes a process of democratic consolidation.  
 
1 Presidential System and Legislature-Executive Relations 
Some basic principles of the presidential form of government have 
implications for legislature-executive relations. Firstly, the Chief Executive is 
elected in a popular election thus, having his or her own electoral base (Shugart 
& Carey, 1992). Concurrently, an elected legislative assembly is created to 
parallel the Chief Executive on the basis of the principle of separation of powers 
(Beermann, 2011). The Chief Executive and the legislature thus have their own 
electoral mandates, being separately elected. The second principle is the 
constitutionally fixed term of office of the Chief Executive. Until that prescribed 
term ends, he cannot be discharged by legislative votes of no-confidence even 
if he or she favours policies opposed by the legislative authority (Cheibub, 
2007), though it may be possible to remove a Chief Executive for criminal 
wrongdoing by the process of impeachment (Lijphart, 1999). It has been 
established, however, that the impeachment of a president does not necessarily 
occur simply as a result of political disagreement between the branches of 
government (Riggs, 1997; Penings, 2003). In a presidential system of 
government, therefore, the tenure of both the legislature and the executive are 
fixed and are not dependent on mutual confidence of the two arms. Thirdly, 
there exists a constitutionally guaranteed executive authority to execute the 
laws which implies that one branch (legislature) makes the laws, the other 
(executive) implements them (Samuels & Eaton, 2002); thus, the President has 
extensive governmental authority vested in him to manage the government 
bureaucracy (Nijzink, Mozaffar & Azevedo, 2006). The fourth principle is that the 
Chief executive has control over the cabinet as a result of his power to select 
his ministers without restriction and the ministers are responsible to him and not 
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to the legislature (Idahosa & Ekpekurede, 1995). These basic characteristics 
are the salient premises on which presidential system rests and have been 
followed in all presidentialist regimes (Riggs, 1997; Akinsanya, 2005).   
Some consequential legislature-executive relations arise from these 
institutional arrangements. The control over the state bureaucracy is divided 
between rival centres of authority – the executive and the legislature. The 
separate electoral mandate and fixed tenure of the executive and the legislature 
means that the executive does not depend on the continued support of the 
legislature to stay in power (Nijzink, Mozaffar & Azevedo, 2006). Furthermore, 
the idea of separate electoral mandate and fixed tenure and the constitutional 
authority of the executive to implement the laws in a presidential system inform 
the separation of purpose or political preferences between the executive and 
the legislature (Samuels & Eaton, 2002). In addition, the institutional 
arrangement in which both the Chief Executive and the legislature are popularly 
elected and are mandated to pursue policies can create a dual popular 
legitimacy. This dual democratic legitimacy results in frequent legislature-
executive stalemates and impairs the ability of the presidential political system 
to control its appointed officials (Linz, 1994; Pennings, 2003). In another 
dimension, the Chief Executive is elected for a fixed period and often cannot be 
extended because of term limits, and cannot easily be shortened (Linz, 1994). 
This can lead to legislature-executive deadlock thus weakening the 
accountability of the chief executive to the elected legislative assembly (Weaver 
& Rockman, 1993). Further still, the dual popular legitimisation of presidential 
system based on the fact that both the executive and the legislature are 
mandated to pursue policies, creates power parity over sovereignty or 
supremacy over each other (Abonyi, 2006). Consequently, loose connection 
between the chief executive and legislative leadership due to separation of 
powers and separate elections makes legislature-executive relations in a 
presidential system cumbersome and perhaps conflictual by design (Smith, 
Stuckey & Winkle, 1998). Since there is no constitutional principle that can be 
invoked to resolve conflict between executives and legislatures, such as the 
vote of no confidence of parliamentary systems, deadlocks would provide 
incentives for actors to search for extra constitutional means for resolving their 
differences, thus making the system prone to instability (Cheibub, 2002, p. 285). 
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2 Legislature-Executive Relations at the State Level of 
Nigeria’s Presidential System 
The ecstasy that greeted the decision to opt for the presidential system in 
1979 revealed the hope that it would usher in clean political governance in the 
Nigeria. The need for unity, energy, and dispatch inherent in the single 
executive system – the President, and a provision for a clear separation of the 
roles, personnel and powers of the executive and the legislature capable of 
harmonious inter-organ relations as well as ensure the independence of the 
legislature so as to enhance the performance of both the executive and 
legislative organs of government are identified as some of the reasons for 
adopting the presidential system by the 1977/78 Constituent Assembly (Oni, 
2013; Gberevbie, 2014).  Thus, while each arm is vested with power over some 
defined activities of government, in many respects, however, conjugal efforts 
and collaboration are constitutionally required for the exercise of power (Dudley, 
1982 & Fasagba, 2009). In this new system, there is a clear separation between 
the executive and the legislature, the executive deriving its power from the 
direct popular vote of the electorate and from the constitution (Ekwueme, 2005). 
Consequently, Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers of 
Nigeria at the federal level in the National Assembly and at the State level of the 
federation in the House of Assembly of the State. Section 5, on the other hand, 
vests the executive powers of the Federation in the President at the Federal 
level and the executive powers in a State in the Governor of the State. Section 
6, however, vests the judicial powers of the Federation and a State therein in 
the Judiciary, consisting of the Courts established for the Federation and the 
States by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution (CFRN, 1999).  
As noted by Oshio (2004, pp.3; 2008, pp.3), although the 1999 Constitution 
vests the governmental powers on the three separate arms of government, the 
division of powers is not created to institutionalise isolation of any arm of 
government. Thus, the definition of powers to each arm only ensures an 
interlocking system of checks and balances rather than an absolute separation 
of powers, which is impracticable. In essence, therefore, the separation of 
powers operationally involves a sharing of the powers of government, a system 
of checks and balances which allows each arm of government to defend its 
position in the constitutional framework of government. It needs flexibility, 
understanding and cooperation among the arms with each of them recognising 
the limits and enforcing them (Oshio (2008, p. 6). In this way, the purpose of 
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government is fulfilled through contributions from all the arms as partners in 
progress. The relationship between the legislature and the executive at the state 
level of the presidential system of government has, however, over the years 
been characterised by mutual suspicion, acrimony and political rivalry. In the 
Second Republic, Kaduna State was the first to blaze the trail when the state 
House of Assembly brought the full force of the provisions of the Constitution as 
regards the impeachment of elected public office holders to bear on former 
Governor Balarabe Musa on June 23, 1981(Nwannekanma & Ogbodo, 2010). 
The acrimonious legislature-executive relationship in the state was instigated by 
the fact that the governor’s party did not command the majority in the State 
legislative assembly.  While the Governor was elected on the platform of 
Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), the State’s legislative assembly was 
dominated by a rival party - the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) (Oyediran, 
1980). The legislature-executive confrontation, given this scenario, was not 
unexpected since it was a case of minority government in which the 
government’s party did not have control of majority of the seats in the 
legislature. At the peak of the confrontations, Governor Balarebe Musa who 
was legitimately elected by the electorate was impeached by the Kaduna State 
House of Assembly (Awotokun, 1998).  
The experience of Kaduna State however, contrasted the acrimony that 
greeted legislature-executive relations in the then Bendel State, where the 
government party - Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) also controlled a comfortable 
majority in the State House of Assembly (Mbah, 2007). The impeachment of the 
State Governor by the Bendel State House of Assembly is thus suggestive of 
the dynamic and complex nature of legislature-executive relations at the state 
level of Nigeria’s presidential system (Oyediran, 1980).  In a similar dimension, 
the Deputy Governor of Kano State was impeached by the State’s legislative 
assembly on the ground of his refusal to perform the duties assigned to him by 
the Governor (Aiyede, 2005). In the then Gongola State however, the 
impeachment proceeding initiated by the State House of Assembly against the 
Governor of the State on the account of gross misconduct was frustrated. In 
fact, the state assembly had secured the signatory of 43 out of the 61 members 
of the house to impeach the Governor but the impeachment proceeding was 
closed following the denial of the allegations by the Governor (Olojede, 2008). A 
Similar incidence also happened in Rivers State where a motion of 
impeachment was moved against the state Governor for alleged financial 
impropriety, nepotism and indiscipline. The motion however, could not secure 
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the support of the majority of its members and was, therefore, rebuffed 
(Akinsanya and Davies, 2002). The Governor of Ondo State was also victim of 
legislature-executive hostility that resulted in impeachment threat against him 
(Awotokun, 1998).  
When the legislature was permitted to exist under schemes of diarchy during 
the aborted Third Republic, confrontations characterised legislature-executive 
relations at the state level of the country. In Osun State, the Governor Isiaka 
Adeleke appointed two commissioners whose candidatures Osun State House 
of Assembly had earlier rejected on the ground of tax default. When the State 
Assembly questioned the Governor over such unconstitutional act, the Governor 
simply objected based on Decree 50 of 1991 which shielded the executive from 
legislative scrutiny (Davies, 1996). In Lagos State also, the State House of 
Assembly threatened the state Governor – Otedola with impeachment for his 
contempt on the House by revoking the land allocated to its members.  The 
Governor of Cross River State also faced impeachment threat from the State 
assembly for daring to ask the basis for fixing N25,000.00 per annum to each 
legislator as salary and allowance of a personal assistant (Awotokun, 1998). 
The legislature-executive face-offs during the Second Republic were, 
however, slight compared with the Fourth Republic (Lawan, 2010). The 
impeachment of Governor - Diepreye Alamesieagha by the Bayelsa State 
House of Assembly was one of such legislature-executive face-offs at the State 
level of Nigeria’s presidential system in the Fourth Republic. Governor Diepreye 
Alamesieagha was impeached by the State’s legislators on the ground of gross 
misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office which included 
corruption, abuse of office and extra-budgetary and fraudulent expenditures 
(Owei, 2002). His impeachment, however, showed abuse of the powers of 
impeachment by the state legislature. The Governor was impeached by fifteen 
(15) out of the twenty-four (24) members of the state assembly (Lawan, 2010). 
This number obviously, did not constitute the two-third (2/3rd) majority of the 
House required by section 188 of the 1999 Constitution to initiate impeachment 
proceeding.  
Another case of legislature-executive face-off at the state government level 
was the acrimony that led to the impeachment of Senator Rasheed Ladoja, the 
Governor of Oyo State on January 12, 2006 (Lawan, 2010). The impeachment 
process was also clearly unconstitutional. Less than two-third (2/3rd) of the 
members of the State House of Assembly (18 out of 32 members) were present 
at the hotel in the capital city, Ibadan when the House made the resolution 
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adopting the report of the panel of investigation on allegation brought against 
him (Ogunmade, 2006).  
The controversial impeachment of the Anambra state governor - Peter Obi 
by the State House of Assembly on November 2, 2006 is another instance of 
legislature-executive conflict at the state level of the federation. The Mike 
Belonwu-led faction of the Anambra State House of Assembly got the governor 
impeached. The impeachment proceeding was done outside the assembly 
complex at the early hour of 5.00am under the cover of darkness (Onah, 2007). 
At the time of the impeachment, the panel constituted by the state judge – 
Justice Chuka Okoli to investigate allegations of corruption against the 
governor was yet to submit its report. The report was constitutionally required to 
be adopted by two-third (2/3rd) members of the house before commencing the 
impeachment proceeding (Lawan, 2010). Mike Belonwu however, ‘secured’ 
twenty-one (21) votes of the 30-member to impeach the governor despite that 
no fewer than thirteen (13) legislators were purportedly to be Obi’s loyalist, while 
one (1) of the legislators was hospitalised in London during the impeachment 
verdict and two (2) other members of the House denied ever being part of the 
plot. It was, however, alleged that the legislators’ actions were orchestrated by 
PDP leadership and Chief Andy Ubah who wanted to be the next governor of 
the state (Airahuobhor, 2007). 
The case of Ekiti State also comes to the fore in the analysis of legislative 
and executive relations at the state level in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Governor 
Peter Ayodele Fayose and his deputy, Mrs. Biodun Olujimi were impeached 
on 16th October, 2006 by twenty-four (24) out of the twenty (26) members of the 
State House of Assembly (Lawan, 2010). It was only in this case that the 
constitutional requirement of at least two-third (2/3rd) members of the house to 
conduct the impeachment proceeding was satisfied. The deliberation by the 
House on the report of the seven-man panel led by Ebenezer Omotoso 
submitted to it, found the governor and his deputy guilty of all the financial 
allegations levelled against them (Ogunmade, 2006). They were accused of 
embezzling state funds, particularly the Ekiti State Poultry Project handled by 
Governor Fayose’s childhood friend and contractor, Gbenga James. 
Consequently, the speaker, Mr. Friday Aderemi was sworn as acting governor 
of Ekiti State (Ailemen, 2007). 
Another victim of legislature-executive squabble was Governor Joshua 
Dariye of Plateau State who was impeached in controversial circumstances on 
November 13, 2006 by 8 out of the 24 members of the State House of Assembly 
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(Olojede, 2008). He was impeached by the State lawmakers after a legislative 
panel set up to try him for corruption, submitted its findings to the House (Onah, 
2007). The lawmakers alleged that he stole the resources of the people of 
Plateau State and converted same to his own, laundered the money (eight 
million pounds, i.e, two billion naira) and siphoned it into various accounts in 
England contrary to Section 15(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Ngamsa, 2007). The Supreme Court however, ordered his 
reinstatement on 27 April, 2007 on the ground that  one-third (8 out of 24) of the 
members of the Plateau State House of Assembly did not form a quorum for  
the purpose of commencing and concluding impeachment process under 
section 188 of the 199 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Dariye's 
term of office as Governor of Plateau State, however, concluded on 29 May 
2007 and so he could not return to office (Ailemen, 2007). It is pertinent to note 
that the House of Assembly group that plotted the impeachment action firmly 
enjoyed the support of the Federal Government (Olojede, 2008). 
The impeachment move against Governor Borni Haruna of Adamawa State 
was however, unsuccessful. While Governor Boni Haruna was out of the 
country for medical treatment, 17 of the 25 members of the Adamawa State 
House of Assembly commenced impeachment process against him for alleged 
gross misconduct, misappropriation of several billions of naira and involvement 
in money laundering and inability to perform his constitutional duties as required 
by the 1999 Constitution (Airahuobhor, 2007). The House accused the governor 
of diverting over N50 billion meant for the payment of the state's foreign debts 
incurred by the defunct Gongola State (Oni, 2013).  
It is asserted here that this nature of the inter-branch relations is contrary to 
the position of Madison (1992) who, while defending the newly proposed 
American constitution in 1788, noted an underlying principle of competition and 
rivalry among the branches as means of limiting and controlling government. As 
Nigeria works out representative democracy, conflicts continue to persist 
between the executive and legislative branches with severe implications on 
good and effective governance. More often than not, instead of being partners 
in governing, the executive and the legislature at the state level of the Nigeria’s 
presidential democratic governance have been relating with each other as 
antagonist – which does not augur well for democratic consolidation and 
development in Nigeria.  
It is pertinent to point out that most of these cases of legislature-executive 
tussle were orchestrated largely by local godfathers in alliance with the 
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presidency (Albert, 2005, Animasahun, 2013; Olojede, 2008). The politics of 
godfatherism in Nigeria is attributable to the pattern and character of funding 
and campaign financing. Through this, the godfathers had so much political 
influence within their individual states and the country in general and are able to 
control the party and impose anti-democratic whims and caprices (Animasahun, 
2013). This is evidenced by their being able to impose virtually all principal 
officers and candidates for public offices in the party. They decide who become 
governors, legislators, local government chairmen, etc., in their constituencies 
and ensure that the disobedient godsons are impeached (Albert, 2005). In the 
case of Senator Rasheed Ladoja, the Governor of Oyo State for instance, the 
lawmakers’ impeachment move was instigated by Lamidi Adedibu’s Ladoja’s 
political godfather. Lamidi Adedibu had made Senator Rasheed Ladoja to be 
nominated as the gubernatorial candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP) in 2002 and worn the election but felt betrayed by the governor for not 
making financial returns to him (Lawan, 2010). The impeachment process was a 
tacit script and support of President Obasanjo (Animasahun, 2013). In fact, the 
impeachment move was after the lawmakers returned from a series of meetings 
with the President and leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 
Abuja. The ex-while governor was alleged to be too close to Vice President 
Atiku Abubakar who was against the President (Ngamsa, 2007).  
In the same vein, the impeachment of Governor Obi by the State lawmakers 
was instigated by Chris Uba’s politics of godfatherism which was believed to be 
at least tacitly supported by the presidency in Abuja (Onah, 2007). The 
legislative action against Governor Boni Haruna was also alleged to have been 
instigated by the President of the federation. It must be noted that Boni Haruna 
became the Governor of Adamawa state in April 1999 when Vice-President 
Atiku Abubakar, the elected governor was elevated to the position of the Vice-
President. He was re-elected in April 2003 (Airahuobhor, 2007). Boni 
Haruna tenaciously remained loyal to his political godfather, the Vice President 
– Atiku Abubakar. This constituted an obstacle to President Obasanjo in his 
war to obliterate the political influence of Vice President Atiku in Adamawa 
State (Onah, 2007). In March 2006, Boni Haruna opposed President Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s third term ambition and repeated his opposing stance during a 
meeting of 20 state governors in April 2006. Haruna’s action in this manner 
obviously would have pitched him against the President, hence the plot to have 
him (Haruna) impeached. The impeachment of Governor Alamesieagha in a 
similar dimension was stage-managed by the presidency through the Economic 
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and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) (Gberevbie, 2014).  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is quite apparent that an atmosphere of conflicts and gridlocks, particularly 
when such are based on selfish and parochial interests, is antithetical to 
democratic consolidation and sustainable development. While legislative-
executive conflict may be inevitable in the presidential democratic government, 
mechanism for harmonious relationship between the two branches is imperative 
for good governance. In this regard, it is significant that both the executive and 
the legislature see their roles as mutually supportive. Though a separation of 
powers exists between the two organs, each one needs the other to function 
properly. Thus a harmonious working relationship is the ideal towards which 
both should aspire and pursue. Furthermore, a mechanism for mediating 
between party members in the executive and the legislature should be instituted 
by political parties in Nigeria. Such mechanism should be constitutionally 
supreme over its members and must be able to legally mediate between party 
members in the legislative assembly. It must also able to sanction such 
members whose activities in government are capable of breeding acrimony. 
However, such mechanism will have influential control over members in the 
legislature only if deflection from one party to another by members of the House 
is prohibited. Any serving member of the House who may wish to leave the 
party on which platform he or she was elected into the House should have his 
seat in the House vacated and then be subjected to competitive election.  
The politics of patronage have made godfatherism phenomenal parasitic 
with severe implications for participation, political stability, democratic 
consolidation, peace and development. Political Parties should, therefore, shun 
the domination of money bags politicians. Party leadership should closely 
monitor their activities while relevant agencies of government such as the 
States Security Service (SSS) and The Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) should constantly investigate their political activities. 
Moreover, the presence of an empowered civil society that can demand that the 
executive and the legislature always govern according to constitutional 
stipulations is indispensable. There is, therefore, the need for public vigilance on 
the activities of government and their power as constituents to recall their 
representatives adjudged to be non-performing in the State Assembly. 
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